Super bonus, this is how we have mortgaged our economic policy for the next five years

Initial forecasts for Super bonus They were from 36.5 billion eurosToday we have reached 93, but the number is estimated to exceed 100 billion. that it Rewards Which during the biennium 2021-2022 contributed to GDP growth of only 1%, allowing the redevelopment of only 3.5% of Italian residential buildings (mostly single-family). Silently, and unbeknownst to most people, the 110% bonus had already been torn up The public treasury is very weak. Nearly 100 billion – to which the interface rewards of 26 billion are added – would cost on average around 100 billion 25 billion euros annually: In fact, the national economic policy for the next five years has become mortgaged. In the super-reward generation, two sets of problems clearly emerge. The first is linked to the performance of democracy itself: There was basically no opposition to this measure.

Nor politics (the same government forces, which are attacking this measure today, They did not even secretly support him from the opposition benches, to make another turn), not even coming from the world of information. In fact, there has been a general lack of interest and disinterest in the topic on the part of the media world, as well as the academic world. Economists. The second, and perhaps decisive, reason was the errors of oversight institutions, primarily the State General Accounting Office. After the Covid crisis, many barriers to public finances fell, and so did they MEF It did not preserve state finances as happened in the past.
Before approving the super bonus, the Parliamentary Budget Office – which has only an advisory role – warned of the potential impact and risks of underestimation.

And whoever had the decisive institutional power to stop the introduction of debt spending was precisely there accounting. However, estimates of this measure were lower at around €78 billion, if all construction bonuses were taken into account. It cannot be denied that it was a very serious technical error, perhaps unprecedented. This is certainly not to remove the responsibility of politics and parties for their choices, but rather to get people to think about the possibilities that, in the face of such obvious errors, even technical judgments could unfortunately succumb to pressure from Palazzo Chigi and its executives. . In this context – which represents a credibility problem between the higher technical roles of oversight and assurance – politics must appear more charged with responsibility, by making itself more aware of its ability to direct and influence.